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i:; THE SUPREME COURT 
PR070 CITY, a municipal corpc-
ation of the Sta^e of LU^Ui, ) 
Plaintiff-Respondent, / 
°^ v. ) 
HUBERT C, LAMBERT, State Sngi- ) 
neer o'c the State of Utah. : 
) C v -
Defendant-Apoellant, 
PR070 ^IUZh WATER USERS ASSO-
CIATION, a corporation; KENNE-
COTT COPPER CORPORATION, ^ .;o-
poration; SALT LAKE CITY, a ) 
municipal corporation; and, : 
CENTRAL UTAH WATER CONSERVANCY ) 
DISTRICT, a public corporation : 
o^ *-he State of Utah, ) 
Intervenors-Aopellants.) 
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The district court denied appellants1 motion by Order dated 
February 14, 1975. On March 11, 1975, Appellants filed a Peti-
tion for Intermediate Appeal, On March 12, 1975, Respondent 
filed a Motion to Amend its Complaint to include other equitable 
remedies available under the factual circumstances of this case* 
Respondent's Motion to Amend was granted by the Court on April 
22, and its Amended Complaint was subsequently filed. The. Appel-
lants declined to answer the Amended Complaint by disregarding or 
applying a different interpretation to Rule 7(b)(2) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, which designates that a minute entry of 
the Court, as applied to this case, is considered a formal order. 
The Appellants declined to answer Respondent's Amended Complaint 
initially on the basis that a formal order had not been prepared 
and signed by the Court, and later, after the Intermediate Appeal 
had been granted on April 30, 1975, on the grounds that the trial 
court had lost jurisdiction. Respondent takes the position that 
the appellants should have filed their answer to the Amended Com-
plaint and are dilatory for not so doing. The causes of action 
as set forth in the respondent's Amended Complaint (R.32) will 
also be argued. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
One can only appreciate the rights claimed by the Respondent 
to the waters of Lost Lake Reservoir if viewed in a historical 
perspective. The following statement of facts in addition to the 
following arguments will be supported by reference to documents 
on file in the State Engineer's office of which' the Court can 
take judicial notice. McGary v. Thompson, 114 Utah 442, 201 P.2d 
288 (1948); American Fork Irrigation Company v. Linke, 121 Utah 
90, 239 P.2d 188 (1951) . 
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On December 4, 1930, Application 2077-E was assigned to 
Provo City by the Provo Reservoir Company. The application gave. 
Provo City the right to enlarge Lost Lake Reservoir and to appro-
priate 960 acre-ft. of water. (Note: Throughout the brief 
mention is made of three (3) different figures concerning the 
amount of water in Lost Lake; they are (1) 960 acre-ft.—the 
amount of the original application 2077-E-l, (2) 799 acre-ft.— 
the amount for which Provo City submitted proof, based upon the 
year 1940, and (3) 784 acre-ft.—the approximate amount that was 
historically used from Lost Lake Reservoir). Application 2077-E 
was segregated on December 14, 1931, and designated 2077-E-l to 
distinguish the rights between Provo City and the Provo Reservoir 
Company to the waters of Lost Lake Reservoir. Construction on 
the dam was completed on October 22, 1931, at a cost to Provo 
City of approximately $25,000.00. The initial attempts at 
storing 960 acre-ft. were unsuccessful as the U.S. Forest Service 
determined that the reservoir would only hold 799 acre-ft. 
without creating a possible hazard. From 1932 to 1974, Provo 
City stored and beneficially used the following amounts of water 
from Lost Lake Reservoir: 
WATER STORAGE IN LOST LAKE 
(1)1932—532 acre-ft. (1)1933—634 acre-ft. 
(2)1934—784 acre-ft. 1935—756 acre-ft. 
1936—784 acre-ft. 1937—784 acre-ft. 
1938—784 acre-ft. 1939—741 acre-ft. 
1940—799 acre-ft. 1941—784 acre-ft. 
1942 — 784 acre-ft. 1943—784 acre-ft. 
1944—784 acre-ft. 1945—784 acre-ft. 
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1946—784 acre-ft. 
1948—784 acre-ft. 
1950—784 acre-ft. 
1952—784 acre-ft. 
1954—784 acre-ft. 
1956—784 acre-ft. 
1958—784 acre-ft. 
1960—784 acre-ft. 
1962—784 acre-ft. 
1964—784 acre-ft. 
1966—711 acre-ft. 
1968—711 acre-ft. 
1970—321 acre-ft. 
1972—321 acre-ft. 
1947—784 acre-ft. 
1949—784 acre-ft. 
1951—784 acre-ft. 
1953—784 acre-ft. 
1955—784 acre-ft. 
1957—784 acre-ft. 
1959—784 acre-ft. 
(3)1961—545 acre-ft. 
1963—784 acre-ft. 
(4)1965—711 acre-ft. 
1967—711 acre-ft. 
(5)1969—321 acre-ft. 
1971—321 acre-ft. 
1973—321 acre-ft. 
1974—321 acre-ft. 
The following footnotes apply to those years when an amount 
less than 784 acre-ft. was stored. 
(1) U.S. Forest Service would not allow Reservoir to fill 
so that checks could be made as to the construction of the dam 
and possible leaks. 
(2) Water stored but released by Provo River Commissioner 
to satisfy prior rights because of low water. 
(3) Low water year. 
(4) Decision to limit storage due to settling of dam to a 
point that a sufficient lap surface was not available for 784 
acre-ft. of storage. 
(5) Decision to limit storage to 321.78 acre-ft. covered by 
Certificate of Appropriation No. 3686. 
The above figures are taken from the Provo River Commis-
sioner' s annual reports, which are records of the State Engineer 
and documents of which this Court can take judicial notice. 
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In 1932, Provo City filed Application a-1187 allowing the 
City to change the point of diversion and use of 960 acre-ft. of 
Lost Lake Storage Water from irrigation to domestic and municipal 
use. Lost Lake Waters were to be released into the Provo River 
and diversions for municipal use were to be made from Bridal Veil 
Falls and Lost Creek. This Application was originally protested 
by Utah Power and Light, but a subsequent contract between Provo 
City and Utah Power and Light provided that Provo City would sup-
ply storage water to Utah Power and Light in exchange for the water 
from Bridal Veil Falls and Lost Creek. Provo City then began to 
divert water from Bridal Veil Falls and Lost Creek under Applicaton 
a-1187. 
Provo City requested additional extensions of time for proof 
of beneficial use under applications 2077-E-l and a-1187 until 
October 5, 1942. The reason for this delay was to try to submit 
proof on the largest quantity of water possible and accordingly 
the proof of 1940 for 799 acre-ft. was submitted. 
After Provo City's proof of beneficial use on 799 acre-ft. 
was submitted on October 5, 1942, no further action was taken by 
the State Engineer's office until 1948. On May 3, 1949, the 
State Engineer issued Certificate No. 3686 for the erroneous 
amount of 321.78 acre-ft., contrary to the proof submitted. 
This is an interesting sidelight that should be commented on. 
In this action the State Engineer and the Intervenors allege that 
the respondent should have filed an action against the State Engi-
neer within sixty (60) days after the issuance of Certificate No. 
3686, yet the State Engineer waited over six (6) years before he 
ever returned Provo City's proof of beneficial use with the erro-
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neous calculations. The prejudicial nature of such a delay was 
manifest by the fact that Provo City's Engineer, who had prepared 
the proof of beneficial use had been replaced and was unavailable 
to counsel the City in regard to errors made by the State Engineer. 
The main problem concerning Certificate of Appropriation No. 
3686 is the inclusion of Applications 10547 and 10586. These 
Applications were originally filed by Orem City to appropriate 
water from Bridal Veil Falls and Lost Creek. They were rejected 
by the State Engineer, but subsequent negotiations resulted in an 
agreement whereby the applications were assigned to Provo City 
with Orem retaining a one-seventh (1/7) interest. They were rein-
stated by the Court on March 22, 1938, and eventually became con-
fused with Application a-1187 because the sources of water to be 
used were identical and they were all based on exchanges for stor-
age water. The main differences between the applications is that 
a-1187 had already been in effect for six (6) years in conjunction 
with Application 2077-E-l while Applications 10547 and 10586 did 
not refer to Lost Lake Waters but to Deer Creek Reservoir waters 
which were not available when the applications were filed. Appli-
cations 10547 and 10586 should never have been included with 
Application 2077-E-l. 
The mistakes and misunderstandings concerning Application 
2 077-E-l apparently became moot when the State Engineer, through 
his agent the Provo River Commissioner, continued to deliver 784 
acre-ft. of water to Provo City contrary to Certificate No. 3686 
which allowed only 321.78 acre-ft. (See the above statistics 
taken from the Provo River Commissioners reports). Here again, 
the respondent must respectfully attack the position taken by the 
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State Engineer and Intervenors who claim that Provo City was 
dilatory in not bringing this action within sixty (60) days,—the 
State Engineer waited over twenty (20) years before he himself 
ever recognized Certificate Ho, 3686, 
The actual controversy before the Court began in 1969 when 
the State Engineer reduced the amount of water allowed to be 
stored by Provo City in Lost Lake Reservoir from 784 acre-ft. to 
321.7 8 acre-ft. At that time, Provo City was at a loss to under-
stand why the reduction was made or why Certificate No. 3686 
limited it to 321.78 acre-ft. Shortly thereafter, Provo City 
made a complete audit of its records and the records of the State 
Engineer concerning Application 2077-E-l and became aware of the 
errors made by the State Engineer in issuing Certificate No. 
3686. City officials tried to approach the State Engineer and 
members of his staff to consider the mistakes made in issuing 
Certificate No. 3686 and to correct the error, but these efforts 
were disregarded. 
Provo City then filed this action against the State Engineer 
to correct Certificate No. 3686 or to allow it to submit an 
additional proof of appropriation. The Intervenors, who have 
never used this water and have no right or claim to it, were made 
parties by the lower court. It should be noted that none of the 
Intervenors claim that the water is theirs or that they have a 
use for it. They are only arguing a technicality of the law. 
Provo City spent approximately $10,000.00 in the summer of 
1974 to repair the dam at Lost Lake Reservoir thereby assuring 
the ability to store and use the water which is now in dispute. 
These expenditures were made with the implied consent of the 
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State Engineer's office and the understanding that an agreement 
would be reached whereby Provo City could use the full 784 acre-
ft. of water. This expense and effort has now also been held for 
naught by the State Engineer. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks a remand to the district court to allow the 
parties to present their evidence and to determine the matter on , 
the merits. 
POINT I 
THE APPELLANTS ARE ESTOPPED FROM DENYING RESPONDENT ITS FULL 
RIGHT TO THE WATERS OF LOST LAKE RESERVOIR. 
Mention has already been made of the delay and inaction of | 
the State Engineer1s office from 1942 to 1948 on the "proof of i 
beneficial use" submitted by Provo City in 1942. Such inaction 
in itself constitutes laches and prejudiced the respondent's I 
position. 
It is difficult to reconstruct the events that actually took | 
place when Certificate No. 3686 was actually issued in 1949, but i 
it is certain that Provo City officials could not have been aware 
of the total impact of the certificate because the City was still I 
receiving 784 acre-ft. of water from Lost Lake Reservoir instead 
of the 321.78 acre-ft. evidenced by the Certificate. In effect, | 
the State Engineer was saying,--"Here is your Certificate for i 
321.78 acre-ft., but don't worry about it, we have given you and 
will still give you 784 acre-ft. out of Lost Lake Reservoir"—and 
such was the case as the State Engineer continued to allow Provo 
i 
City to use 784 acre-ft. of water from the reservoir until 1969. , 
For twenty (20) years the State Engineer stood by and delivered 
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784 acre-ft. of water to Provo City and then in 1969 he took the 
position that Provo City had lost its right to appeal his (a 
different engineer's) decision. 
The elements of estoppel as accepted by this Court in Mig-
liaccio v. Davis, 232 P.2d 195, 120 Utah 1, are as follows: 
1
 . . . equitable estoppel or estoppel in 
pais is the principle by which a party who 
knows or should know the truth is absolutely 
precluded, both at law and in equity, from 
denying or asserting the contrary of, any 
material fact, which, by his words or con-
duct, affirmative or negative, intentionally 
or through culpable negligence, he has in-
duced another, who was excuseably ignorant 
of the true facts and who had a right to re-
ly upon such words and conduct, to believe 
and act upon them thereby, as a consequence 
reasonably to be anticipated, changing his 
position in such a way that he would suffer 
injury if such denial or contrary assertion 
were allowed.' 
With respect to water law in general this Court has approv-
ingly quoted the following: 
According to Hutchins, Selected Problems 
In the Law of Water Rights in the West, 
p. 402, rights may be lost f. . . by appro-
priates who by there inequitable conduct, 
by acts and declarations, have led others 
to make use of their water rights on the 
assumption that such use would be entirely 
legal. Appropriaters whose conduct has 
been such are subsequently estopped from 
asserting their own rights.1 Wellsville 
East Field Irr. Co. v. Lindsay Land Co., 
104 Utah 448, 137 P.2d 634 (1943) 
The actions of the State Engineer, in (1) delaying action on 
the proof of appropriation submitted by Provo City, and (2) con-
tinuing to grant Provo City the right to use the amount of water 
upon which proof was submitted, estop him from now saying that 
the right is less than what he represented it to be by his 
actions at that time. Provo City relied upon the acts or omis-
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1 
sions of the State Engineer. He should not now be allowed to 
reverse his position. I 
It is also a well accepted principal that governmental 1 
departments such as the State Engineer's office can be estopped 
to prevent injustice if the necessary elements or grounds of I 
estoppel are present. Shafer v. State, 521 P.2d 736, 83 Wash.2d 
618 (1974), City of Long Beach v. Mansell, 476 P.2d 423, 91 I 
Cal.Rptr. 23 (1970), Crawford v. Mclaughlin, 473 P.2d 725, 172 j 
Colo. 366 (1970), Silver City Consolidated School District No. 1 v. 
Board of Regents of New Mexico Western College, 401 P.2d 95, 75 I 
N.M. 106 (1965) . The later case endorses the principle of 
equitable estoppel as between a public agency and a governmental I 
subdivision. I 
The Appellants are estopped from claiming a sixty (60) day 
statute of limitations as a bar to this claim, and it is Respon- I 
dent's position that title to the waters of Lost Lake Reservoir 
has vested in the citizens of Provo. I 
POINT II I 
THE ACTION OF THE STATE ENGINEER IN ISSUING A CERTIFICATE OF 
APPROPRIATION IS NOT A "DECISION" WITHIN THE MEANING OF U.C.A. I 
§73-3-14 AND §73-3-15. 
Title 73 chapter 3 of U.C.A. 1953, as amended, sets forth • 
the requirements necessary for a party to appropriate waters I 
within the state of Utah. The first sections of said chapter 
(section 73-3-1 through 73-3-7) outline the procedure for filing | 
both applications to appropriate and also protests to said 
applications. The next sections (73-3-8 through 73-3-10) deal I 
v/ith approval or rejection of said applications. The next I 
.•'.,'• - 1 0 -
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sections (73-3-11 through 73-3-13) are provisions governing the 
applicants completing the proposed construction necessary for the 
appropriation. Then sections 73-3-14 and 73-3-15 set forth the 
provisions governing review of decisions made by the State 
Engineer affecting applications, not certificates of appropriation. 
The certificate of appropriation and its significance is set 
forth after the sections governing review of the engineer's 
decisions (sections 73-3-16 and 73-3-17). 
In support of this interpretation are several arguments. 
(1) If the issuance of a certificate of appropriation is a 
"decision" as stated by the appellants, its issuance must also 
comply with the provisions of section 73-3-14. It states in 
part: 
In any case where a decision of the state 
engineer is involved any person agrieved by 
such decision may within 60 days notice 
thereof"bring a civil action in the district 
court for a plenary review thereof. The 
state engineer shall give notice of his 
decision by mailing a copy thereof by re-
gular mail to the applicant and to each 
protestant and notice shall be deemed to 
have been given on the date of mailing. 
(emphasis added) 
Applying the above section and following the appellants line 
of reasoning, every time a certificate of appropriation is issued, 
a copy, letter, or memorandum must be sent to each of the parties 
who protested the application. This, of course, is not the 
procedure outlined by the statutes or followed by the State Engi-
neer's office. Section 73-3-17, which describes the procedure 
involved in issuing a certificate of appropriation states the 
following: 
. . . One copy of such certificate shall be 
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filed in the office of the State Engineer 
and the other shall be delivered to the 
appropriator or to the person making the 
change . . . 
Section 73-3-14 states that copies of the decision must be 
sent to protestors while section 73-3-17 says that only two 
copies are to be made, one for the State Engineer and one for the 
appropriator. These sections are clearly irreconcilable if, as 
the appellants claim, section 73-3-14 applies to 73-3-17. The 
appellant's position would also give the protestants to an appli-
cation another opportunity for judicial review. The first being 
a review of the decision to approve the application and the 
second being a review of the decision to issue the certificate of 
appropriation. Again this is clearly not the procedure outlined 
by the statutes of this state nor followed by the State Engineer's 
office in administering water rights. 
(2) Since the protestants never receive notice of the 
issuance of a Certificate of Appropriation how can they possibly 
protest it? Section 73-3-14 cannot possibly apply to the issuance 
of a Certificate of Appropriation. 
(3) In addition to the fact that the protestants never 
receive notice of the issuance of a certificate, the issuance of 
a certificate to the appropriator is a good deal different than 
notice of a "decision11 of the State Engineer/ 
A "decision" of the State Engineer involving an application 
has historically and always included language, such as the fol-
lowing, to warn the parties of their rights: 
"This decision is subject to the provisions 
of 73-3-14, U.C.A., 1953, which provides for 
plenary review by the filing of a civil ac-
tion in the appropriate district court with-
in 60 days from the day hereof. (See appendix 
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A for an example of a decision of the State 
Engineer. See page 2, of Appendix A, next 
to the last paragraph, for the above lan-
guage. ) 
In contrast, whenever a certificate of appropriation is is-
sued, no such language is used nor is there an accompanying letter 
to that affect. The result is that the appropriator is never warn-
ed of his rights of review. To the knowledge of the respondent, 
the State Engineer has never before in any other case contended 
that the issuance of a certificate was notice of his "decision", 
nor has the engineer in any other case known to the respondent fail-
ed to issue a "decision" in his customary manner. In this case, 
the theory adopted by the engineer is a deviation from a uniform 
application of the law and would seem to the respondent to vio-
late Article 1, Section 2 of the Utah State Constitution which re-
quires the law to be uniformly applied, and further, it is uncon-
stitutional under the "equal protection" clause of the 14th Amend-
ment to the Constitution of the United States. 
The above reasons demonstrate clearly that any argument 
asserting that §73-3-14 and §73-3-15 are applicable to §73-3-17 
must fail. 
POINT III 
A CERTIFICATE OF APPROPRIATION IS ONLY PRIMA FACIA EVIDENCE 
OF THE FACTS CERTIFIED AND ITS VALIDITY IS SUBJECT TO JUDICIAL 
REVIEW. 
The appellants hold as inviolate the representations of a 
Certificate of Appropriation. The statute describes a Certi-
ficate of Appropriation as prima facia evidence of the holders 
right. (Section 73-3-17 Utah Code Annotated, 1953), This Court 
has stated that in the determination of water rights a Certifi-
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cate of Appropriation is "only prima facia evidence of the facts 
certified". United States v, District Court, 121 Utah 1, 238 
P.2d 1132 (1951). 
A case that deals directly with an attack on a Certificate 
of Appropriation is Warren Irrigation Company v. Charlton et al., 
58 Utah 113, 197 P.2d 1030 C1921). The case involves a subse-
quent appropriator (Charlton) who is diverting water to the 
injury of the plaintiff (Warren Irrigation Company). One of the 
defendant's defenses was that the Certificate of Appropriation 
relied upon by the plaintiff was "only prima facia evidence" of 
the water right claimed. This Court held that since the defen-
dant was "not in any sense a party to or interested in the pro-
ceeding concerning the application" which finally culminated in 
the issuance of the certificate he could not collaterally attack 
the Certificate of Appropriation held by the plaintiff. The 
Court stated, however, that the result would be different if the 
party attacking the Certificate had had a direct interest in 
the issuance of the Certificate. 
. „ . We may go further by way of il-
lustrating our views and suggest that, 
if appellants had in any manner shown 
themselves to be interested as contem-
plated appropriators of the water under 
the state law, they might have had a 
right of action in a direct proceeding 
to cancel and annul the Certificate of 
Appropriation on some equitable grounds 
for cancellation. (Warren Irrigation 
Company v. Charlton, supra, p. 1033). 
(emphasis added) 
The Court further stated that a comparison should be made 
between Certificates of Appropriation for water and Patents 
issued for public land. 
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sented here should be determined by the 
same rules and principles which control 
in cases involving the effect given to 
patents issued for public land by the 
land department of the United States. 
In Moore v. Robbins, 96 U.S. 530, 24 
L.Ed. 848, the doctrine is well stated 
in the second and third paragraphs of 
the syllabus: 
[2J. If there be any lawful reason why 
the patent should be cancelled or re-
scinded, the appropriate remedy is by a 
bill in chancery, brought by the United 
States, but no executive officer is 
authorized to reconsider the facts on 
which it was issued and to recall or 
rescind it or to issue one to another 
party for the same track. 
[3]. But when mistake or fraud or mis-
contraction of the law of the case exists, 
the United States or any contesting claimant 
for the land may have relief by a court of 
equity, (emphasis added) 
In Smelting Co. v. Kemp, 104 U.S. 636, 26 
L.Ed. 875, the first and second paragraphs 
of the syllabus read: 
1. A patent, duly signed, counter-signed 
and sealed, for public lands which, at 
the time it was issued, the land department 
had, under the statute, authority to con-
vey, cannot be collaterally impeached in 
an action at law; in the finding of the de-
partment touching the existance of certain 
facts, with the performance of certain an-
tecedent acts, upon which the lawful exer-
cise of that authority may in a particular 
case depend, cannot, in a court of law, be 
questioned. 
2. If in the issuing of a patent the officers 
of that department take mistaken views of 
the law, or draw erroneous conclusions from 
the evidence, or act from either imperfect 
views of duty or corrupt motives, the party 
agrieved cannot set up such matters in a 
court of law to defeat the patent. He must 
resort to a court of equity where he can 
obtain relief, if his rights are injurious-
ly affected by the existence of the patent, 
and he possesses such equities as will con-
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trol the legal title vested in the patentee. 
A stranger to the title cannot complain of 
the act of the government in regard thereto." 
(Italics ours.) 
The court states definitely that an action to review the 
issuance of a Certificate of Appropriation is acceptable and 
proper in a court of equity. Provo City is not a stranger to the 
title of this water and has every right to present its' evidence 
concerning the mistakes, errors, and misconstruction of law that 
were involved in the issuance of Certificate No.3686. In fact, 
Provo City is entitled to have the State Engineer issue a "deci-
sion" within the meaning of §73-3-14 and §73-3-15 from which, 
if contrary to its proof of appropriation, it could appeal. 
POINT IV 
ANY PROCEEDINGS OR DECISIONS OF THE STATE ENGINEER ARE 
ADMINISTRATIVE IN NATURE AND DO NOT DETERMINE THE FINAL RIGHTS OF 
THE RESPONDENT. 
If, as the appellants claim, the issuance of a Certificate 
of Appropriation is a "decision" of the State Engineer, it would 
still not preclude the respondent from bringing an action to en-
join interference with its water right. This Court has discussed 
several times the nature and effect of the administrative pro-
ceedings before the State Engineer. 
The case of Eardley v. Terry, 94 Utah 367, 77 P.2d 362, 365, 
366 (1938), is probably the best discussion of how water rights are 
actually determined. There it is pointed out that the proceedings 
before the State Engineer, the district court, and even the Supreme 
Court with respect to approving an application are not determinative 
of the relative rights of the parties to the use of water theretofore 
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proving an application only gives the new appropriator the right 
to proceed with the construction of his project. If, after the 
project is completed or any time thereafter, it appears that the 
new appropriation is interfering with prior rights, the prior ap-
propriators would not be precluded from bringing an independent 
action to enjoin the diversion of their waters. Thus a "decision" 
of the State Engineer would be subject to judicial review years 
after the sixty (60) day period had expired. [See also United 
States v. District Court, 121 Utah 1, 238 P.2d 1132, 1135 (1951)]. 
The only purpose of a sixty (60) day time limitation in which, 
the decision of the State Engineer can be reviewed is to prevent 
any legal interference after the sixty (60) day period from those 
who were protestants so that the applicant can proceed with his 
project until completed. Once, however, the project is completed, 
the applicant is ..subject, at any time, to legal action if he inter-
feres with the prior rights of others. Such a procedure encour-
ages the development of the waters of this state without preju-
dicing the rights of prior appropriators. 
This same principle was recently affirmed in a Ninth Circuit 
case, United States v. Cappaert, 508 F.2d 313 (1974). In that 
action the National Park Service had protested the drilling of a 
group of wells in Nevada near a National Monument area. A hear-
ing was conducted by the State Engineer, at which the National 
Park Service was present, and a decision resulted in the approval 
of the drilling of the wells. The United States did not appeal 
the decision, but approximately a year later, when it became 
obvious that the wells were interfering with the water in the Park 
area, it brought an action to enjoin the defendants from pumping 
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the water. The State of Nevada intervened and argued that since 
the United States had participated in the hearing and had not 
appealed the matter, the decision of the State Engineer was res 
judicata and the independent action could not be heard. The 
Ninth Circuit rejected that argument holding that the proceeding 
before the State Engineer's office was an administrative pro-
ceeding and not determinative of the rights of the parties. The 
applicant was, therefore, free to proceed and drill his wells and 
try to perfect a right without interfering with others, but if he 
drilled the wells and did interfere, then the remedy would be to 
file an independent action to enjoin the applicants. The Court 
further stated: 
Even if the United States had waived 
its sovereign immunity, we are not bound 
to give res judicata effect to the deci-
sion of an administrative body in a case 
of this kind. 
* As the Court said in Grose v. Kohen, 
406 F.2d 823, 824 (4th Cir. 1969): 
'Res judicata of administrative decisions 
is not incrusted with a rigid finality 
that characterizes the precept of judi-
cial proceedings . . . Application of the 
doctrine often serves a useful purpose in 
preventing relitigation of issues adminis-
tratively determined, . . . but pratical 
reasons may exist for refusing to apply 
it, e.g., United States v. Stone & Downer 
Co., 270, 274 U.S. 225, [47 S.Ct. 616, 71 
L.Ed. 1013] (1927). And in any event, when 
traditional concepts of res judicata do 
not work well, they should be relaxed or 
qualified to prevent injustice. 2 Davis, 
Administrative Law, §18.03 (1958).' 
Even if this Court should find that the issuance of a 
Certificate of Appropriation is a "decision", then the above 
principles would afford respondent the opportunity to review that 
decision since its rights have subsequently been interfered with 
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to its detriment. Respondent has plead and properly alleged a 
claim for injunctive relief (R. 36) and is entitled to a hearing. 
Along this same line of reasoning, mention should be made of 
the basic nature of water rights. Historically the determination 
of water rights have found exclusive jurisdiction in courts of 
equity (§73-3-15 U.C.A. 1953). Water rights are not inviolate 
and necessarily stable as the appellants assert, but are subject 
to constant judicial review. Civil actions for abandonment or 
forfeiture, (§73-1-4, U.C.A., 1953) and statutory.general adjudi-
cations (§73-4-1 and §73-4-18, U.C.A. 1953) continually reassess 
and redetermine the rights of the litigants. 
Presently there is a general statutory adjudication of all 
water rights taking place in the Provo River-Utah Lake-Jordan 
River drainage area entitled Salt Lake City v. Tamar Anderson, 
106 Utah 350, 148 P.2d 346 (1944). Anyone who holds a Certifi-
cate of Appropriation (including those issued within the last 72 
years) will have it reviewed to see if it still represents the 
true measure of the water right claimed. If it does not, the 
Certificate will be adjusted to reflect the present day use. Any 
allegation or appeal to the effect that the stability of water 
rights is necessary for proper administration is illusory as the 
statutory general adjudication proceedings change those rights 
frequently. Water use and water rights are in a constant state 
of flux and thus subject to judicial interposition. 
POINT V 
THE MUTUAL MISTAKES AND MISUNDERSTANDINGS WHICH OCCURRED IN 
THE ISSUANCE OF CERTIFICATE NO. 3686 ARE EQUITABLE GROUNDS UPON 
WHICH THE TRIAL COURT CAN RETAIN JURISDICTION. 
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The principle that a court of equity can retain jurisdiction 
of a cause of action alleging mistake is well accepted. 
. . . Indeed, it has been said that the 
granting of relief on this ground is one 
of the most familiar functions of the 
court, that mistake, equally with fraud, 
is a ground for judicial interposition. . . 
A mistake relievable in equity is said to 
be some unintentional act, omission, or 
error, arising from ignorance, surprise, 
imposition, or misplaced confidence. . . 
Accordingly, equity may and should always 
intervene to prevent unjust enrichment 
by a party, private or public, by virtue 
of a mistake. The fact of mistake being 
established, the court may, for example, 
correct that which has been done by vir-
tue of its process, divest a title which 
has been acquired, or interpose to prevent 
a forfeiture. 27 Am.Jur.2d, Equity, §28, 
P. 552. 
In the issuance of Certificate No. 3686 there were several 
basic mistakes. 
(1) The first was the complete disregard or ignorance of 
application a-1187 which was an integral part of application 
2077-E-l. Application a-1187 was approved in 1932 and was the 
basis upon which Provo City diverted the waters from Lost Creek 
and Bridal Veil Falls. 
(2) Applications 10547 and 10586 were in fact applications 
based on an exchange with Deer Creek Reservoir water and are in 
no way connected with the water of Lost Lake Reservoir nor were 
they necessary for the proof of beneficial use submitted by Provo 
City. 
(3) The provisions of a contract with Utah Power and Light, 
which v/as also an intregal part of application a-1187, as well as 
applications 10547 and 10586 v/ere disregarded. The contract pro-
) 
vision referred to allowed Provo City up to 30 days to deliver an 
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equal amount of water to Utah Power and Light after it was di-
verted from Bridal Veil Falls and Lost Creek. Provo City was not 
credited for the delivery of this water. 
There are other errors and mistakes which will be important 
at an engineer's rehearing, if one is ordered, or at the trial 
if this proceeding is allowed, which the respondent will not 
discuss in depth at this time. These mistakes, made by both the 
State Engineer's office and Provo City officials, are easily 
explained. From 1930, when the appropriation began, to 1949, 
when the certificate was issued, there were four (4) changes in 
the office of the State Engineer as well as three (3) changes in 
the office of the Provo City Engineer. Especially prejudicial to 
the rights of the respondent was a seven (7) year delay from 
1942, when proof was submitted, to 1949, when certificate No. 
3686 was issued. 
The equitable principles of mutual mistakes come to bear 
when both parties have entered into an agreement or arrived at a 
resolution which is not in conformity with their real intent. 
The real intent and proof of appropriation on application 2077-E-
1 is based upon application a-1187 and Provo City's historical use. 
The State Engineer's intent is evidenced by his continual deli-
very of 7 84 acre-ft of water to Provo City. The respondent has 
alleged and pleaded mutual mistake (R. 33) and is entitled to a 
judicial hearing upon that basis. 
POINT VI 
RESPONDENT HAS BEEN DEPRIVED OF A VALUABLE PROPERTY RIGHT 
WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW, A VIOLATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMEND-
MENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES AND ARTICLE I 
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SECTION 7 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION. 
The State Engineer's office in depriving Provo City of its 
water has acted without any regard for due process. The elements 
of due process as they apply to administrative agencies, which 
would include the State Engineer*s office, are set forth in 
Fuller-Toponce Truck Company v. Public Service Commission, 99 
Utah 28, 96 P.2d 722 (1939). This case involved an action by the 
plaintiff trucking company against the Public Service Commission, 
which had cancelled and annulled a Certificate of Convenience and 
Necessity previously granted to Fuller-Toponce. The trucking 
company complained that its right to due process had been vio-
lated by the administrative agencies actions and decisions. This 
Court held that the Public Service Commission had not deprived 
Fuller-Toponce of due process, but in so deciding it set a stan-
dard by which to measure due process in regards to administrative 
agencies. The Court adopted a quote from 12 Am.Jur. §567-574, as 
that legal encyclopedia existed at that time. 
We read in section 573: "The essential 
elements of due process of law are notice, 
and an opportunity to be heard and to 
defend in an orderly proceeding adapted 
to the nature of the case before a tri-
bunal having jurisdiction of the cause." 
When Certificate No. 3686 was first issued in 1949, the 
State Engineer, ex parte, and without formal notice or a hearing 
reduced Provo City's proof from 799 acre feet to 321.78 acre 
feet. In July, 1969, v/hen the State Engineer deprived Provo City 
of the use of any water above 321.78 acre feet, again there was 
no formal notice or hearing. Repeated attempts were made on an 
informal basis between 1969 and 1973 by Provo City Officials to 
present its evidence to the State Engineer, but a hearing or 
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audience with the State Engineer was denied. A formal petition 
for a hearing before the State Engineer was made on May 26, 1975, 
but the petition has apparently not been acted upon because of 
the litigation now pending. 
The root of this argument is that Provo City has never been 
allowed to present its evidence to any type of administrative or 
judicial body and yet it has already been deprived of a valuable 
water right. This is a clear constitutional violation. All of 
the deliberations and decisions have been made in the State 
Engineer's office, without the participation of the respondent. 
If the relief sought by the appellants is granted, the respondent 
will have been deprived of its property without a hearing and 
without due process. 
POINT VII 
THE LEGISLATIVE INTENT AND JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF SEC-
TION 73-3-1 UTAH CODE ANNOTATED,'1953, DOES NOT PROHIBIT PROVO 
CITY'S ACQUISITION OF THE WATERS OF LOST LAKE RESERVOIR BY AD-
VERSE POSSESSION. 
The last sentence of §73-3-1 U.C.A. 1953 was added in 1939 
and provides that no water rights can be acquired by adverse 
possession. Prior to 1939 it was recognized that water rights 
could be obtained by adverse possession. (Wellsville East Field 
Irrigation Co. v. Lindsay, supra). 
More recent judicial opinions have also held that water 
rights initiated before 1939 qualified for appropriation by 
adverse possession. In re Drainage Area of Bear River in Rich 
County, 12 U.2d 1, 361 P.2d 407 (1961), In re Use of Water within 
Drainage Area of Green River, 12 Utah 2d 102, 363 P.2d 199 (1961). 
"
 :
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The elements of adverse possession are seven (7) years contin-
uous, uninterrupted, hostile, notorious, and adverse enjoyment. 
(Wellsville Eastfield Irrigation Company v. Lindsay, supra). 
Provo City first began to divert and use the waters of Lost 
Lake Reservoir in 1932. (See table in statement of facts). From 
1932 to 1939, a period of eight (8) years, Provo City laid all 
claim to the water exclusive of any other users. The amount 
diverted in the year, 1934, when the water was not used, can be 
explained. The year, 1934, was a dry year and many of the pri-
mary rights on the Provo River were not satisfied. As such, the 
secondary rights (of which Lost Lake was one) were not allowed to 
use their full right. This in itself was not an interruption of 
the basic right because other secondary rights on the river were 
also denied use of any water. 
A case is also made for Provo City's acquistion of the water 
right by adverse possession from 1940 to 1969 and especially from 
1949 to 1969 when certificate No. 3686 was supposedly the measure 
of the right. 
It appears that the legislative and judicial intent of that 
portion of section 73-3-1 U.C.A. which prohibits the acquisition 
of water rights by adverse possession is based upon the following 
reasons: 
(1) To have one statutory procedure by which a water right 
can be perfected. 
(2) To alert the public or put on notice those that have an 
interest in the waters of this state. 
(3) To prevent numerous claims against other parties1 
water rights. 
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(4) The fact that adverse possession is difficult to prove 
and the presumption is against it. 
Respondent submits that if the above four reasons describe 
the case against the doctrine of adverse possession then Provo 
City should not be precluded from claiming the waters of Lost 
Lake Reservoir by adverse use. In response to each of the above 
four (4) reasons it is submitted that: 
(1) Provo City complied with the stautory process but was 
frustrated by the mistakes and delays encountered in the State 
Engineer's office. 
(2) Notice was given upon application, and notice was given 
for 37 years, 1932 to 1969, through the public records of the 
Provo River Commissioner and the State Engineer's office. 
(3) Provo City is not claiming anyone else's water, it only 
wants to reclaim its own. This water has never been used by the 
appellants or any other party. 
(4) The public records of the State Engineer's office show 
the extent and use of the waters of Lost Lake Reservoir by Provo 
City. For this case no proof is required; Provo City has used 
approximately 784 acre-ft. of water for 37 years. 
There is no logical reason to prevent Provo City from ac-
quiring title to the water of Lost Lake Reservoir by the theory 
of adverse possession. 
POINT VIII 
THE ECONOMIC WASTE AND INEFFICIENT USE OF RESOURCES THAT 
WOULD RESULT IF PROVO CITY IS NOT ALLOWED TO USE LOST LAKE RESER-
VOIR IS CONTRARY TO PUBLIC POLICY. 
Provo City has invested over $50,000.00 in the construction 
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j 
and maintenance of Lost Lake Reservoir, with the majority of I 
those costs at 1932 prices. At today's price levels the reser-
voir is an asset worth up to one-half of a million dollars. I 
Appellants now contend that a reservoir that will hold 784 acre 
feet of water should only be allowed to hold 321.78 acre feet, • 
thereby wasting over half of the capacity of a valuable resource. I 
This court has repeatedly stated that the waters of this state 
should be put to their fullest and most efficient use. American I 
Fork Irrigation Company v. Linke, 121 Utah 90, 239 P.2d 188 
(1951), United States v. Caldwell, 64 Utah 490, 231 P. 434 (1924). I 
It is difficult to imagine that there should be any argument at I 
all as to what action would best serve the interests of the 
taxpayers and citizens of this state. I 
The position of the appellant, Central Utah Water Conser-
vancy District, in this regard is almost unbelievable. Their • 
position is that Provo City should not be allowed to fill its | 
reservoir because they want to build their own Jordanelle Reser-
voir. That type of reasoning probably makes sense if your I 
business is contracting the construction of reservoirs, but not 
if you are responsible for the tax dollars of the public. • 
CONCLUSION | 
Provo City has proved that it can store and beneficially use 
approximately 784 acre-ft. of water from Lost Lake Reservoir. I 
Provo City can also explain and prove to a trial court that 
several mistakes were made in the issuance of Certificate of • 
Appropriation No. 3686. The appellants are well aware of this I 
and for that reason they fear a judicial or administrative 
hearing that would re-establish Provo Cityfs rights. They have | 
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no factual or equitable leg to stand upon, but instead cling to a 
legal shoestring that is destined to break from too much twisting 
and turning. 
For 37 years Provo City used the waters of Lost Lake Reser-
voir without any of the intervenors claiming that their rights 
were infringed upon. Only when Certificate No. 3686 raised its 
ugly head in 1969 did the hue and cry go forth. None of the 
intervenors can presently show how they could possibly use the 
waters of Lost Lake if Provo City did not. The water would be 
wasted as spring flood waters. 
Respondent submits that this cause of action should be 
remanded to the trial court for a hearing and a determination on 
the merits. 
Respectfully submitted, 
JaoKcbn Howard, for: 
HC^ ?ARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-
Respondent 
120 East 300 North 
Provo, Utah 84601 
MAILING AFFIDAVIT 
I, JACKSON HOWARD, Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent, hereby 
certify that I mailed tv/o copies of the foregoing Brief to Dallin 
W. Jensen, Attorney for Defendant-Appellant, 442 State Capitol 
Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114; Joseph Novak, Attorney for 
Intervenor-Appellant, 520 Continental Bank Building, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84101; Edward W. Clyde, Attorney for Intervenor-Appellant, 
351 South State Street, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111; Ray L. Mont-
gomery, Attorney for Intervenor-Appellant, 101 City & County Build-
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ing, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111; James B. Lee, Attorney for 
Intervenor-Appellant, 79 South State Street, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84111, this 7?* day of August, 1975. 
J^L*s£L 
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V v 
APPENDIX A 
BEFORE THE STATE ENGINEER OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF CHANGE ) 
) MEMORANDUM DECISION 
APPL. NO. a-7739 (55-762) ) 
Change Application No. a-7739 ('55-762 was filed by Provo City 
Corporation to change the point of diversion of 10.0 sec. ft. 
of water evidenced by Appl. No. 26902, Cert. No. 7798. The 
water has been diverted from three wells located: (1) South 
1150 feet and East 970 feet from the N% Cor. Sec. 1, T7S, R2E; 
(2) North 1115 feet and East 823 feet from the S% Cor. Sec. 25, 
T6S, R2E; and (3) South 47 9 feet and East 568 feet from the NW 
r?^:r. Cor. Sec. 1, T7S, R2E, SLB&M; and has been used for municipal 
purposes. Hereafter, it is proposed to divert the water from 
points No. 1 and No. 2, same as heretofore, and in addition, a 
new 20-inch well, 600 feet deep, at a point North 952.25 feet 
and East 27.36 feet from the SW Cor. Sec. 7, T6S, R3E, SLB&M. 
The water will be used the same as heretofore. 
The change application was advertised in the Orem-Geneva Times 
May 9 through May 23, 1974 and was protested by Kennecott Copper 
Corporation. A hearing was held on the above-numbered change 
application on February 25, 1975 in the Utah County Courthouse 
in Provo, Utah. The applicant had not received the notice sent 
by the State Engineer and was not represented at the hearing. 
Provo River Water User's Association entered a protest after ob-
serving at the hearing. The protestant expressed concern that 
the utilization of the well in immediate proximity to the Provo 
River may interfere with their water rights. The well had been 
drilled by Provo City under a temporary change application and 
there were some indications that the well was not entirely success-
ful; therefore, the question was raised at the hearing whether or 
not Provo City was still interested in the well and what informa-
tion had been developed through the drilling and testing of the 
well. 
Accordingly, Provo City was asked to submit data gathered during 
the drilling and testing of the well, which they did. The well 
log shows that the well was drilled to 469 feet through various 
strata of clays and gravel. No appreciable water was found in the 
first 200 feet, and water was added to the hole to facilitate 
drilling the first 50 feet. The casing was perforated from 195 
to 212 feet, from 222 to 337 feet and from 346 to 402 feet, but 
the static water level was" at 225 feet, indicating low production 
in the upper strata. The pump test yielded 1,032 gpm with 63.5 
. drawdown and 1,200 gpm with 66 feet drawdown. The water quality 
is within acceptable limits of the Utah State Department of Health. 
In view of the information that has been provided by Provo City 
to the State Engineer and from his investigation into this matter, 
it is the opinion of the State Engineer that the development from 
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as the existing well which will be abandoned. The static level 
in the well indicates that it would have no effect upon Provo 
River, and it appears that it will not cause any interference 
with other rights in the area. 
It is, therefore, ordered and Change Appl. No. a-7739 (55-762) 
is hereby APPROVED subject to prior rights and with the follow-
ing conditions: 
1. That no more water can be taken from the three points 
of diversion than the 10.0 sec. ft. under the original 
application. 
2. That the well be provided with a totalizing water meter 
and that this meter shall be available to the State 
Engineer or his representative at any reasonable time 
as may be required for regulating the development. 
This decision is subject to the provisions of Section 73-3-14, 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, which provides for plenary review by 
the filing of a civil action in the appropriate district court 
within sixty days from the date hereof. 
Dated this 4th day of June, 1975. 
DCH:EDF:jb 
cc: Kennecott Copper Corporation 
c/o James B. Lee 
P. 0. Box 11898 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
cc: Provo River Water User's Association 
c/o Joseph Novak 
520 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
cc: Provo River Water User's Association 
84 North University Avenue 
Provo, Utah 84601 
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